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ABSTRACT
Training deep neural networks (DNN) is expensive in terms of com-
putational power and the amount of necessary labeled training data.
Thus, deep learningmodels constitutebusinessvalue fordataowners.
Watermarking of deep neural networks can enable their tracing once
released by a data owner. In this paperwe define and formalizewhite-
boxwatermarkingalgorithms forDNNs,where thedataownerneeds
white-box access to the model to extract the watermark. White-box
watermarking algorithms have the advantage that they do not im-
pact the accuracy of the watermarkedmodel.We demonstrate a new
property inference attack using aDNN that can detectwatermarking
by any existing,manually designed algorithms regardless of training
data set andmodel architecture.We then propose the first white-box
DNNwatermarking algorithm that is undetectable by the property
inference attack. We further extend the capacity and robustness of
the watermark. Unlike prior watermarking schemes which restrict
the content of watermark message to short binary strings, our new
scheme largely increase the capacity and flexibility of the embedded
watermark message. Experiments show that our new white-box
watermarking algorithm does not impact accuracy, is undetectable
and robust against moderate model transformation attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
With data becoming an asset, owners try to protect its use and dis-
semination. This includes protecting publicly accessible machine
learning models derived from this data. However, a machine learn-
ing model is itself only data and can be easily copied and reused.
Watermarking [19] may enable to trace copied models. Watermark-
ing embeds a secret message into the cover data, i.e. the machine
learning model, that can only be retrieved with a secret key.
In the recent past several watermarking algorithms for neural
networks have been proposed [2, 6, 27, 29, 33, 36, 41]. These algo-
rithms can be broadly classified into black-box watermarks and
white-box watermarks (see also our related work discussion in Sec-
tion 2). A black-box watermark can be extracted by only querying
the model (black-box access). A white-box watermark needs access
to the model and its parameters in order to extract the watermark.
Black-boxwatermarks [2, 6, 27, 33, 41] necessarily need to impact the
accuracy of the model, since two perfectly accurate models cannot
be distinguished by their query results. This, however, can be unac-
ceptable. Machine learning models are, for example, used in medical
applications, such as cancer diagnosis [9, 20]. A misclassified cancer
patient with potential health consequences versus the intellectual
property rights of a model owner may be a hard to justify trade-off.
To the contrary, white-box watermarks can work without accu-
racy loss. White-box watermarks as introduced by Uchida et al. [36]
and later refined by Rouhani et al. (DeepSigns) [29] only modify the
weights of themodelwithout impacting accuracy.However, themod-
ification of weights can be easily detected. Wang and Kerschbaum
[37] showed that Uchida et al.’s algorithmmodifies the variance of
the weights and can be easily detected. Besides, the watermark can
be removed by an overwriting attack.
In this paper we generalize the research onwhite-boxwatermark-
ing algorithms. First, we provide a scheme to reason aboutwhite-box
watermarking algorithms (Section 3) – encompassing the existing
algorithms of Uchida et al. [36] and DeepSigns [29].We then present
a generic detection attack of white-box watermarks that we argue
can distinguish watermarked from non-watermarked models for
any manually designed, white-box watermarking algorithm. This
detector is another deep neural network that performs a property
inference attack [10] with the property being watermarked or not.
Our experiments show that this attack can be used across model
architectures and data sets.
Given that we designed a generic detector of white-box water-
marks, we can design a new, improved watermarking algorithm that
is resilient to these (and other model transformation) attacks (see
Section 5). Building upon the generic detection attack, we set up an
adversarial learning network – similar to a generative adversarial
network (GAN) – where the training of the watermarked model is
the generator and our generic detector is the discriminator. Using
this automated approach we show how to embed an undetectable
watermark which has no accuracy loss.
Furthermore, we make our white-box algorithm robust to model
transformation attacks. As Wang and Kerschbaum [37] point out
watermarks can be easily overwritten by their own embedding algo-
rithm.We show thatwhenwe replace thewatermark embedding and
extraction – a function similar to a single layer perceptron [29, 36]
– with a more powerful function – a deep neural network – this
attack can be prevented, since it increases the capacity to embed a
watermark. Our watermark extractor is trained while embedding
thewatermark andmapsweights to randommessages except thewa-
termarked weights to the watermark message. In our experiments
we demonstrate that it is very hard to overwrite this watermark
– very different from Uchida et al.’s original proposal. Our experi-
ments show that our algorithm is also robust against other model
transformation attacks.
Contributions. In summary, in thispaperwecontribute threemachine
learning algorithmsusing deepneural networks for attacking andde-
fendingwatermarks in deep neural networks and their experimental
evaluation:
• a property inference attack as a generic detector of white-box
watermarks in neural networks (Section 4). This algorithmworks
across data sets and architectures.
• an adversarial learning network that can thwart the generic de-
tector of white-box watermarks (Section 5.1). The resulting dis-
tribution of weights in our newwatermarking algorithm is indis-
tinguishable from non-watermarked weights.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
14
26
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
1 O
ct 
20
19
TianhaoWang and Florian Kerschbaum
• a complex, watermark-specific extractor of a watermark from
weights (Section 5.2). The resulting watermark is harder to over-
write than existing white-box watermarks.
Finally, we combine those threemachine learning algorithms into
a new white-box watermarking algorithm for deep neural networks
that does not impact accuracy, is undetectable and robust against
moderate model transformation attacks.
2 RELATEDWORK
Watermarking techniques for neural networks can be classified into
black-box and white-box algorithms. A black-box watermark can be
extracted by only querying the model (black-box access). A white-
boxwatermark needs access to themodel and its parameters in order
to extract the watermark. In this paper we present a white-box wa-
termarking algorithm. The first white-box algorithmwas developed
by Uchida et al. [36]. Subsequently Rouhani et al. [29] presented
an improved version. We generalize both algorithms into a scheme
for white-box watermarking algorithms and present their details in
Section 3.
A first attack on Uchida et al.’s algorithm was presented byWang
andKerschbaum [37]. They show that the presence of awatermark is
easily detectable and that it can be easily removed by an overwriting
attack. We emphasize that a white-box watermark that does not im-
pact accuracy cannot protect against model stealing attacks [18, 28],
sincemodel stealing is a black-box attack and the black-box interface
is unmodified by the watermark. However, white-box attacks still
have important applications when the model needs to be highly
accurate or model stealing attacks are not feasible due to a restricted
number of queries or available computational resources.
Black-boxwatermarking algorithms have the advantage that they
only need black-box access to the watermarked neural network to
extract the watermark, but theywill necessarily impact the accuracy
of the watermarked model. The first black-box watermarking algo-
rithms using backdoors [7, 12, 25] where concurrently developed
by Zhang et al. [41] and Adi et al. [2]. A backdoor is additional, out-
of-distribution training data inserted to trigger abnormal behavior
on the inserted data [7, 12, 25], also referred to as an integrity poi-
soning attack. This attack can be prevented by an attacker with a
pre-filter that detects “abnormal” images and thenanswers randomly
[16]. However, this counter-measure can be circumvented by using
more clever backdoor images [24]. Shafieinejad et al. show that these
backdoor-based watermarks can be easily removed using efficient
model stealing attacks [30].
There are other types of black-box algorithms. Chen et al. [6]
and Le Merrer et al. [27] use adversarial examples to generate wa-
termarks. Szyller et al. [33] modify the classification output of the
neural network in order to embed a black-box watermark. All black-
box algorithms are obviously susceptible to sybil attacks [16], unless
access to multiple, differently watermarked models is prevented.
3 BACKGROUND
This section provides a formal definition ofwhite-boxwatermarking
of deep neural networks. We provide a general scheme that encom-
passes at the least the white-box neural network watermarking
algorithms in [29, 36].
3.1 Deep Neural Networks
In this paper, we focus on deep neural networks (DNNs). A DNN is
a function F :X→Y , whereX is the input space, usually Rm , and
Y is the collection of classes where each valid input x ∈X belongs
to. We assume that for every x ∈ X , it belongs to a unique class
y ∈Y , i.e. there exists a perfect oracle function Of for ground-truth
classification function f :X→Y which can always correctly predict
the classy of any instance x ∈X . In this paper, we do not consider
the case when some x ∈X are undetermined or belong to multiple
classes. ADNNF has function parametersw , which is a sequence of
adjustable values to enable F fitting a wide range of mappings. The
valuesw are also commonly referred asmodel parameters ormodel
weights. For an instance x ∈ X , we represent the output of neural
network F as F (x ;w). LetW be the parameter space ofw , i.e.w ∈W.
W is usually high-dimensional real space Rn for DNNs, where n is
the total number ofmodel parameters. The goal of training aDNNF
is to letF approximate the function f by updatingw . The training of
DNNs is theprocessof searching for theoptimalw inparameter space
to minimize a function Eo :W→R, which is typically a categorical
cross-entropy derived from training dataXtrain ⊂X and its classes
Ytrain assigned by f . Eo is commonly referred to as loss function.
The accuracy of F after training depends on the quality of the loss
functionEo , while the quality ofEo in turn depends on the quality of
the training data (Xtrain ,Ytrain ). The search for a global minimum
is typically performed using a stochastic gradient descent algorithm.
To formally define training, we assume there exist three algo-
rithms:
• Eo←DesignLoss(Xtrain ,Ytrain ) is a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm that outputs loss function Eo according to the
available training set (Xtrain ,Ytrain ).
• wi+1 ← TrainBatch(Eo ,wi ) is a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm that applies one iteration of a gradient descent algo-
rithm to minimize Eo with the starting weightswi , and outputs
the resulting weightswi+1.
• w←Train(Eo ,w0) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
that appliesTrainBatch(Eo ,wi ) iteratively forp(n) stepswhere in
the i-th iteration the inputwi is thewi returned from the previous
iteration step. The algorithm outputs the final model parameters
after p(n) steps, where p(n) is a polynomial in n. For simplicity
in the following text, when the initial weightsw0 are randomly
initialized, we omit argumentw0 and simply write Train(Eo ).
A well-trained DNN model F is expected to approximate the
ground-truth function f well. Given DNN F and loss function Eo ,
we say F is ϵ-accurate if
Prx ∈X [F (x ;w), f (x)]<ϵ
wherew is the trained parameter returned by Train(Eo ).
A regularization term [5], or regularizer, is commonly added to
the loss function to prevent models from overfitting. A regularizer
is applied by training the parameters using Train(Eo+λER )where
ER is the regularization term and λ is an empirical coefficient to
adjust its importance.
3.2 White-boxWatermarking for DNNmodels
Digital watermarking is a technique used to embed a secret message,
the watermark, into cover data (e.g. an image or video). It can be used
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to provideproof of ownershipof cover datawhich is legally protected
as intellectual property. In white-box watermarking of DNNmodels
the cover data are themodel parametersw . DNNs have a high dimen-
sion of parameters, where many parameters have little significance
in their primary classification task. These parameters can be used
to encode additional information beyond what is required for the
primary task.
A white-box neural network watermarking scheme consists of a
message spaceM andakey spaceK. It also consists of twoalgorithms:
• m←Extract(w,k) is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm
that given model parametersw and (secret) extraction key k out-
puts extracted watermark messagem.
• wwm ,k← Embed(Eo ,w0,m) is a probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm that given original loss function Eo , a watermark mes-
sagem and initial model weights parametersw0 outputs model
parameters wwm and (secret) extraction key k . In some water-
marking algorithms [29, 36] k can be chosen independently of E0,
w0 andm using a key generation functionKeyGen. For generality
including our watermarking scheme we, however, combine both
algorithms into one.
The extraction of the watermarks, i.e. algorithm Extract(w,k)
usually proceeds in two steps: (a) feature extractionдwm and (b)mes-
sage extraction e . The extraction key is also separated into two parts
k = (kF E ,kE ) for each of the steps in Extract. First, given feature
extraction key kF E , features q are extracted fromw :
q←дwm (w,kF E )
Forexample, in thesimplest case, the featureq canbeasubsetofw , e.g.
theweights of one layer of themodel, andkF E is the indexof the layer.
This step is necessary to reduce the complexity of a DNN’s structure.
Second, given message extraction key kE the messagem is ex-
tracted from the features q:
m←e(q,kE )
The function e will be referred to as extraction function or extractor
interchangeably in the remaining text. To avoid generating a trivial
extractor which will extract the same watermark message regard-
less of the input, we must force the extractor to be valid. We say an
extractor is valid, if it has the non-trivial ownership property defined
in Section 3.3. Note that in order to enable watermark embedding,
дwm and e must be differentiable.
Embedding of thewatermark, i.e. algorithmEmbed(Eo ,m) is per-
formed alongside the primary task of training aDNN to approximate
a function f . First, a randomkeyk= (kF E ,kE ) is randomly generated.
Embedding a watermark messagem ∈M into target DNN Ftдt con-
sists of regularizing Ftдt with a special regularization term Ewm .
Let d :M×M→ R be a differentiable distance function measures
the discrepancy between twomessages. For example, whenm is a
binary string of length n, i.e.M⊆ {0,1}n , d can simply be the binary
cross-entropy. Given a watermarkm to embed, the regularization
term is then defined as:
Ewm =d(e(дwm (w,kF E ),kE ),m)
The watermarked model Ftдt with model parameterswwm is ob-
tained by the training algorithm Train(Eo+λEwm ).
3.3 Requirements
There are a set of minimal requirements that a DNNwatermarking
algorithm should fulfill:
Functionality-Preserving: The embedding of the watermark
should not impact the accuracy of the target model:
Prx ∈X [F (x ;wwm )= f (x)]≈Prx ∈X [F (x ;w)= f (x))]
wherewwm is returned by Train(Eo+λEwm ) andw is returned by
Train(Eo ).
Robust: For any moderate model transformation (independent
of the key k , e.g. fine-tuning) mappingwwm tow ′, such that model
accuracy does not degrade, the extraction algorithm should still be
able to extract watermark messagem′ fromw ′ that is convincingly
similar to the original watermark messagem, i.e. if
Prx ∈X [F (x ;w ′)= f (x)]≈Prx ∈X [F (x ;wwm )= f (x))]
wherew ′ is obtained from amoderate model transformation map-
ping such as fine-tuning, then
Extract(w ′,k)≈Extract(wwm ,k)
.
We do not consider robustness against adversarial transforma-
tions that only use the black-box interface F (x ;w ′), since this is
unmodified by white-box watermarking algorithms.
A further requirement we pose to a watermarking algorithm is
that the watermark in the cover data is undetectable. This is a useful
property, because it may deter an adversary from the attempt to
remove the watermark, but it is not strictly necessary.
Undetectable: We say a watermark is undetectable, if no poly-
nomial-time adversary algorithmA wins the following game:
F0←Train(Eo )
F1,k←Embed(Eo ,m)
b
$←{0,1}
Pr [A(Fb )=b]≈
1
2
Loosely speaking, the adversary should not be able to distinguish a
watermarked model from a non-watermarked one. In the literature
[2, 24] further properties of watermarking algorithms have been
defined. We review them here and show that they are met by our
newwatermarking scheme in the remainder of the paper.
Non-trivial ownership: This property requires that an adver-
sary is not capable of producing a key thatwill result on a predictable
message for any DNN. Formally, ∀k ∈K, we have
Prw ∈W,m∈M[Extract(w,k)=m]≈ 1|M|
If this requirement is not enforced, an attacker can find a k that can
extract watermark messagem from anyw ∈W, and then he/she can
claim ownership of anyDNNmodel.We require any valid extraction
function to prevent this attack.
Unforgeability: This property requires that an adversary is not
capable of reproducing the key for a given watermarked model.
Formally, ∀w,w ′ ∈W and ∀m ∈M, we have
Prk ∈K(Extract(w,k)=m)=Prk ∈K(Extract(w ′,k)=m)
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Intuitively, this requirement implies that an adversarial cannot learn
anything about k frommodel weightsw . This property can be eas-
ily achieved by the owner cryptographically committing to and
timestamping the key [2] and is orthogonal to the watermarking
algorithms described in this paper.
Ownership Piracy: This property requires that an adversary
that embeds a new watermark into a DNN does not remove any
existing ones. We show that this property holds in Section 6.5 where
we evaluate the overwriting attack.
3.4 Uchida et al.’sWatermarking Scheme
In Uchida et al.’s scheme, the message space is a sequence of t val-
ues between 0 and 1, i.e.M=Rt[0,1]. A typical watermark message
m ∈ M is a t-bit binary string. Both feature extraction key space
KF E and message extraction key spaceKE are matrix spaces. The
features q to embed the watermark into are simply the weights of a
layer of the DNN, i.e.дwm is the multiplication of a selection matrix
ZF E with the vectorw of weights. Hence the feature extraction key
kF E =ZF E . The message extraction function e does a linear transfor-
mation over the weightswl of one layer using message extraction
key matrix kE =ZE and then an evaluation of the resulting vector
using a sigmoid function to restrict the range of values in the vec-
tor. The distance function d is the binary cross-entropy between
watermark messagem and extracted message e(дwm (w,ZF E ),ZE ).
Formally, Uchida et al.’s watermarking scheme is defined as follows:
• дwm :W×KF E→Wl where дwm (w,ZF E )=ZF Ew =wl .
ZF E is a |wl |× |w | matrix with a 1 at position (i,1), (i+1,2) and so
forth and 0 otherwise where i is the start index of a layer.Wl is
the parameter space of the weights of the selected layer, which is
a subspace ofW.
• e :Wl ×KE→Mwhere e(wl ,ZE )=σ (ZEwl ).
ZE is at×|wl |matrixwhosevaluesare randomly initializedaccord-
ing to standard Gaussian distribution.σ denotes sigmoid function.
• d :M×M→R+ where d(m,y) =m log(y)+ (1−m)log(1−y) and
y=e(дwm (w,ZF E ),ZE )
3.5 DeepSignsWatermarking Scheme
In the DeepSigns scheme [29], Rouhani et al. replace the feature se-
lection part in their watermarking algorithm compared to Uchida et
al.’s scheme. The features ofw they choose to embed the watermark
into are the activations of a chosen layer of the DNN given a trigger
set input. Hence the feature extraction key spaceKF E is a product
space of a matrix space and input space X . The feature extraction
key is kF E = (ZF E ,x). 1
• дwm :W×KF E→Wl where дwm (w,(ZF E ,x)) outputs the activa-
tions of the selected layer of the DNN given trigger set x ⊆X .
• e , d are the same as in Uchida et al.’s scheme.
1DeepSigns assumes a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) as the prior probability
distribution (pdf) for the activation maps. In the paper, twoWM-specific regularization
terms are incorporated during DNN training to align the activations and encode the
WM information. We only describe the principle of the watermarking algorithm in
this paper, but implement their precise algorithm for our generic detection attack.
4 GENERICDETECTIONVIA PROPERTY
INFERENCE
We present our property inference attack that fully distinguishes
watermarked deep learning models from non-watermarked ones,
regardless of their architectures and training data.
Property inference attacks on DNNs [10, 26] have been originally
proposed to extract knowledge about the training data given white-
box access to the model. We propose to use a property inference
attack to detect whether a watermark has been embedded into the
target DNN Ftдt by a white-box watermarking algorithm Embed.
The attack could be used to check whether a watermark removal
attack is necessary and could, for example, be offered as a service
in underground markets.
In our proposed attack, the attacker wants to determine whether
the target model Ftдt has been watermarked by Embed or not. The
attacker only needs to have knowledge of the watermarking algo-
rithm, i.e. the algorithms Extract and Embed defined by functions
(дwm ,e,d). The attacker needs no knowledge about Ftдt ’s architec-
ture or training data and has only to be able to generate ℓ sufficiently
different high-accuracy models for a natural, non-trivial classifica-
tion function, less complex than and unrelated to Ftдt ’s function.
In the following parts, we first present the watermark detection
algorithm and subsequently describe and perform an exemplary
property inference attacks for the above two described watermark-
ing schemes [29, 36].
4.1 Attack Design and Feature Selection
Given a white-box watermarking algorithm Embed and an oracle
OD implementing the detection functionD : {F }→{0,1} that can
always correctly detect watermarks embedded by Embed in any
model, the adversary’s goal is to train a meta DNNmodel Fdet with
parameterswD that serves as a generic watermark detector to ap-
proximate the detection functionD. Formally, the attack algorithm
shall output an ϵ-accurate model Fdet where
Pr [Fdet (F ;wD ),D(F )]<ϵ
for arbitrary DNNmodels F of any architecture and trained on any
data set.
Algorithm 1 shows the process of training such ametamodel. The
intuition behind the generic detection attack is to find unusual pat-
terns among the watermarked models’ weights distributions, given
sufficientlymany examples. DNNmodels trained by similar learning
approach, e.g. using a common regularizer, will represent functions
similarly to some extent, and we conjecture that the similarity of
these function representations is reflected as common patterns in
their model parameters. Hence, a meta model in the form of DNN
Fdet can detect these patterns.
Because of the complexity of DNNs and their architectures, we
need a fine-grained feature representation to assist the watermark
detectionmodel. The feature extraction algorithm is referred to asдD
in Algorithm 1. To improve the performance of the resulting generic
detectorFdet , the feature representation needs to be permutation in-
variant. Ganju et al. [10] show the importance of permutation invari-
ance for successful property inference attacks. In our experiments for
Uchida’s scheme, we extract the histogram of the weights as our fea-
ture for detecting watermarks, in the form of normalized percentiles.
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Algorithm 1Watermark Detection
Input: set of loss functions {Eo }
Output: a generic watermark detector Fdet for white-box
watermarking algorithm Embed.
1: initialize data setXtrain =∅.
2: for i=1 to ℓ do
3: m
$←M
4: Eo $←{Eo }
5: Fwm ,k← Embed(Eo ,m)
6: Fnon← Train(Eo )
7: qwm =дD (Fwm )
8: qnon =дD (Fnon )
9: Xtrain←Xtrain∪{qwm ,qnon }
10: Ytrain←Ytrain∪{0,1}
11: end for
12: Edet←DesignLoss(Xtrain ,Ytrain )
13: Fdet← Train(Edet )
14: return Fdet
4.2 Experimental Results
We investigate the effectiveness of our property inference attack
to distinguish watermarked models from non-marked ones. We re-
fer the models Fwm and Fnon in Algorithm 1 as shadowmodels as
they are used to train our meta DNNmodel Fdet without interact-
ing with the data owner. For each shadowmodel, we assign one of
the two classes of architectures to it: LeNet [22] or Wide Residual
Network (WRN) [39]. LeNet class consists of LeNet-1, LeNet-4 and
LeNet-5; WRN class consists of WRN-1-4 andWRN-1-8. When we
say a shadowmodel is in the class of LeNet orWRN, it means that
the shadowmodel is randomly assigned one architecture from the
collection. We use two classic image recognition data sets MNIST
[23] and CIFAR10 [21] as the training data for shadow models. In
order to ensure the high accuracy, we train shadowmodels in LeNet
class andWRN-1-4 for 100 epochs, and models inWRN-1-8 for 200
epochs. All of the shadowmodels achieve accuracy above 85%.We
use RMSprop [35] with learning rate 0.00005 as the optimization
method for the training of both shadowmodels and Fdet . The mov-
ingaverageparameterρ forRMSprop is set tobe0.9 as suggested [35].
The importance coefficient λ for watermark-related regularization
term Ewm is set to be 0.01 for all watermarked shadowmodels Fwm .
For Fwm in any architecture, we embed a 256-bit random binary
string watermark into the second-to-last layer. The layer types are
fully-connected layers formodels in LeNet, and convolutional layers
for models inWRN. The architecture ofFdet is a simple 2-layer fully
connected network with 512 nodes in the hidden layer.
We use 100 shadow models (i.e. 50 watermarked and 50 non-
watermarked) in LeNet and trained byMNIST as our target model
set, and test the performance of Fdet on it. We investigate the per-
formance of our watermark detection attack in 4 cases differing in
the knowledge of the adversary about the attacked model:
• Same Data, Same Architecture:Theadversaryknowsboth theclass
of architecture and training set of the target model.
• Diff. Data, Same Architecture: The adversary only knows the class
of architecture of the target model. We use shadow models in
LeNet class and but trained by CIFAR10 as the training set.
• Same Data, Diff. Architecture: The adversary only knows the train-
ing set of the target model. We use shadow models trained by
MNIST but inWRN class as the training set.
• Diff. Data, Diff. Architecture: The adversary knows neither the ar-
chitecture nor the training set of the target model. We use shadow
models inWRN class and trained by CIFAR10 as the training set.
For each case, we train 512 shadowmodels (i.e. 256 watermarked
and 256 non-watermarked) in the specific settings above mentioned
as the training set for Fdet . We extract the normalized percentiles
from 0% to 100% for weights in the second-to-last layer as the feature
representation for each shadowmodel.
As shown in Figure 3, both Uchida et al.’s scheme and DeepSigns
are vulnerable to our watermark detection attack. The features ex-
tracted in Uchida et al.’s scheme are simply one layer of weights,
hence the attack performs better on their scheme. However, out
attack still achieves over 75% watermark detection accuracy in the
worst case for the DeepSigns scheme.
5 WATERMARKINGUSINGDEEP LEARNING
5.1 Watermark Detection Prevention
The white-box watermarking algorithms summarized in Section 3
are based on regularization:
E(w)=Eo (w)+λEwm (w)
where Eo is the original loss function for a normally trained model
and Ewm is a regularization term that embeds the watermark mes-
sage intow during training process, but causes the watermarked
model’sweightsdistributiontodeviate fromthatofnon-watermarked
models. As demonstrated in Section 4.2, this extra regularization
term detectably changes themodel’s weights distribution andmakes
watermark detection feasible.
Hence, we propose a new watermark embedding scheme that
protects the watermark against detection attacks. The idea of this
scheme stems from the training of GAN models [11]. The target
neural network Ftдt is trying to compete against a detector neural
networkmodelFdet , which tries to determinewhether awatermark
messagem is embedded into Ftдt . We denote Ftдt ’s parameters as
w and Fdet ’s parameters as θ . Fdet (w ;θ ) evaluates the probability
that Ftдt has been watermarked. While watermarking, we train
Ftдt to minimize the probability that Fdet assigns a “watermarked”
label to its weightsw . Simultaneously, we train Fdet to maximize its
accuracy of assigning a correct label to weightswnon from both non-
watermarked models andw from Ftдt . In essence, Ftдt is learning
the joint probability distribution of non-watermarked weights, just
like the generator in a GAN [11]. However, our proposed approach
differs from GANs in that Ftдt does not need the input noise to
generate an output. Instead, the generated sample is taken directly
from Ftдt itself, i.e. its parametersw after each iteration of update.
Ftдt and Fdet play the following two-player minimax game with
functionV (w, θ ):
min
w
max
θ
V (w,θ )=E[logFdet (wnon ;θ )]
+E[log(1−Fdet (w ;θ ))]
(1)
Hence, in addition to training for the original task (Eo ) and em-
bedding the watermark message (Ewm ),w in Ftдt is also updated
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Figure 1: The performance of Fdet in the first 20 epochs ofmeta training
(a) Uchida et al. - Training Error (b) Uchida et al. - Test Error (c) DeepSigns et al. - Training Error (d) DeepSigns et al. - Test Error
according to Equation 1, accompanied by the training of Fdet :
θˆ =max
θ
(logFdet (wnon ;θ )+log(1−Fdet (w ;θ ))) (2)
wˆ =min
w
(Eo (w)+λ1Ewm (w)−λ2logFdet (w ;θ ))︸           ︷︷           ︸
Edet
(3)
Non-watermarked weightswnon are the model parameters of pre-
viously trained non-watermarked models, which serve as samples
for the joint probability distribution of non-watermarked weights.
During training, we alternately train Ftдt and Fdet . Competition
in this game drives both Ftдt and Fdet to improve untilw is indis-
tiguishable from genuine non-watermarked ones. Consequently,
the watermark is truly undetectable, and the accuracy of the water-
markedmodel is not impacted.We summarize our proposedmethod
in Algorithm 2.
In order to improve the effectiveness of Fdet and hence the effec-
tiveness of detectionprevention,we still need to preprocess the input
for Fdet to turn it into a permutation invariant representation. In
our experiments, we simply sort the weights in tensorflow [1], since
the loss function forFtдt needs to be differentiable. Furthermore, for
the experiments in Section 6, we useWasserstein loss [4] to improve
the stability and efficiency of our GAN-like scheme.
Algorithm 2Watermark Detection Prevention
Input: neural network F with loss function Eo and randomly
initialized parameters w ; detector neural network Fdet with
randomly initialized parameters θ ; a white-box watermark
algorithm featured by regularizer Ewm ; hyperparameter λ;
non-watermarked models with trained weights wnon ; error
tolerance ϵ .
Output: watermarkedmodel Ftдt with undetectable watermarked
weightswwm .
1: while |Fdet (w ; θ ) − Fdet (wnon ; θ )| > ϵ and Ftдt is not
ϵ-accurate do
2: θ← TrainBatch based on Equation 2
3: w← TrainBatch based on Equation 3
4: endwhile
5: return Ftдt
5.2 Watermark Embedding
Recall that a white-box watermarking algorithm Embed consists of
three functions:дwm outputs the featuresofDNNtobewatermarked,
e extracts the watermark message from the features and d measures
the distance between an extractedmessage and the targetmessagem.
In our proposed watermark embedding algorithm, we change the
extraction function e to be another neural network, which we refer
to asFext withmodel parametersθ . To extract awatermarkmessage,
we use the feature vector q extracted by дwm as the input to Fext ,
and compare the output to the watermark messagem using d . Due
to the strong fitting ability of neural networks, Fext can map q to a
wide range of data types ofwatermarkmessagem, e.g. a binary string
or even a 3 channel image. For different types ofm, we choose the
appropriate d accordingly. Formally, our newly proposed white-box
watermarking algorithm is defined as follows:
• дwm :W×K→Wl where дwm (w,Z )=Zw
As in Uchida et al.’s scheme the дwm outputs a layer ofw .
• e :Wl ×Θwhere e(wl ,θ )=Fext (wl ;θ )
Fext is a DNNwith parameter θ , andΘ is the parameter space for
Fext .
• d :M×M→R varies for different data types ofm.
For binary stringsweuse cross-entropyas inUchida et al.’s scheme,
for images we use mean squared error for pixel values.
Our new algorithm largely increases the capacity of the channel
in which the watermark is embedded and hence allows to embed
different data types, including byte-encoded images, whilst in both
Uchida et al.’s algorithm and DeepSigns, the embedded watermarks
are restricted to binary strings. In the embedding algorithms of
those two previous schemes, the number of embedded bits should
be smaller than the number of parametersw , since otherwise the
embedding will be overdetermined and cause large embedding loss.
However, in our new scheme, the adjustable parameter is not only
w but also θ of Fext , which largely increases the capacity of the
embedded watermark.
Next to enabling larger watermarks, the increased channel capac-
ity of a neural network extraction function also enhances the robust-
ness of the watermark. In Uchida et al.’s scheme, e is the sigmoid of a
linear mapping defined by a randommatrixX , which can be viewed
as a single layer perceptron. The resulting watermark can be easily
removed by overwriting. As shown byWang and Kerschbaum [37],
to remove the original watermark binary stringm without knowing
the secret (key) matrixX , an adversary can randomly generate a key
matrixX ∗ of the samedimension, and embedhis/her ownwatermark
m∗ into the target neural network. The result ofXw is a simple linear
projection ofw . Because of the low capacity of a linear mapping, a
randomly generated X ∗ is likely to be very similar to the original
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embedding matrixX in some of thewatermark bit positions. Hence
an adversary who randomly embeds a newwatermark is likely to
overwrite and remove the existing watermark at those bit positions.
In our algorithm, we make the watermark extraction more com-
plex and the secret key more difficult to guess by adding more layers
to the neural network, i.e. we replace the secret matrixX in Uchida
et al.’s scheme by a multi-layer neural network, Fext .
In existing white-box watermarking algorithms, the extraction
function e is a static, pre-determined function depending only on
the key k . In our scheme, however, Fext must be trained alongside
the target watermark in order to enable fast convergence. If the
parameters of Fext , θ , are pre-determined and we can only trainw
to minimize d(m,Fext (дwm (w),θ )), given the complexity of neural
network learning, the embedding loss will be large and models did
not converge in our experiments. This will potentially impair both
the robustness of the watermark and the watermarked model accu-
racy.Hence, instead of only trainingFtдt and updatingw , we update
w and θ alternately to find an efficient way to embed watermark
messagem into Ftдt , as summarized in the following equation:
wˆ,θˆ =min
w,θ
(Eo (w)+λd(m,Fext (w,θ ))) (4)
In our watermarking algorithm, e=Fext (·;θ ) adapts to the message
m. Because of the strong representation power of neural networks,
there are chances that Fext will be trained to be a trivial function
that ignores the input andmaps all inputs to the watermarkmessage
m. This certainly violates the non-trivial ownership requirement
mentioned in Section 3.3. To ensure the validity of the extraction
function, we include pre-trained non-watermarked weightswnon
labeled by random messagesm∗ together with our watermarked
weightsw labeled by watermark messagem to train the extraction
function Fext . Hence our new parameter update equations are:
θˆ =min
θ
(d(m,Fext (w ;θ ))+d(m∗,Fext (wnon ;θ ))) (5)
wˆ =min
w
(Eo (w)+λd(m,Fext (w ;θ )))︸               ︷︷               ︸
Ewm
(6)
Because of the adaptive nature ofFext , onemayworry thatmodel
owner and attacker will obtain the same extraction function e for
the same messagem and target model Ftдt . However, this is nearly
impossible.Fext is not only adaptive tom, but also thewatermarked
features q and hence F . Even for the same F , note that the loss
function of neural networks is in general non-convex. There are very
many local minima for the loss function Eo . It is hence almost impos-
sible for two training processes to fall into the same local minimum.
We experimentally validate our hypothesis in Section 6.5.
5.3 Combination
The watermark detection prevention and embedding algorithms
mentioned in the two previous sections are similar in the sense that
they both use a separate deep learning model (Fdet and Fext ) to
protect or embed watermarks into the target model. It is hence nat-
ural to combine the two algorithms into one new neural network
watermarking scheme. In one round of training, Ftдt ’s parameter
w are updated by loss function
Eo+λ1Ewm+λ2Edet (7)
Algorithm 3Watermark Embedding
Input: neural network F with loss function Eo and parameters
w ; extracting neural network Fext with randomly initialized
parameters θ ; watermark messagem; hyperparameter λ; set
of pre-trained non-watermarked models with weights {wnon };
error tolerance ϵ .
Output: watermarked model Ftдt ; trained extraction function
Fext .
1: for allwnon do
2: m∗ $←M
3: Xembed←Xembed∪{wnon }
4: Yembed←Yembed∪{m∗}
5: end for
6: while d(Fext (w ;θ ),m)>ϵ and Ftдt is not ϵ-accurate do
7: θ← TrainBatch based on Equation 5
8: w← TrainBatch based on Equation 6
9: endwhile
10: return Ftдt , Fext
Figure 2: Flowchart of New White-Box Watermarking
Algorithm
andFext andFdet are updated using Equations 5 and 2, respectively.
Our newly proposed white-box watermarking scheme for deep neu-
ral networks has several advantages including that it does not impact
model accuracy, is undetectable and robust against moderate model
modification attacks, such as overwriting, as demonstrated in the
evaluation in the next section.
Note that Fext in the embedding algorithm tries to distinguish
Ftдt from other non-watermarked models by mapping it to the em-
beddedwatermarkmessagem, whilst the detectorFdet tries tomake
Ftдt indistinguishable from other non-watermarked models. The
functions of Fext and Fdet seem to contradict each other. However,
we stress that in our watermarking scheme, the features q returned
by дwm as the input for Fext are an unsorted layer weights vector,
whilst the input for the Fdet is a sorted weights vector. Hence they
are different functions. Fext can extract a watermark message in a
known location, i.e. a certain permutation of the weights, whereas,
minimizingFdet (w ;θ )uses the sortedweights vector, i.e. theweights
distribution, ofFtдt , in order to render it indistinguishable fromnon-
watermarked models.
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6 EVALUATION
We evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of our newwhite-box
watermarking algorithm in this section.
6.1 Evaluation Setup
We conduct experiments using different data sets, MNIST [23] and
CIFAR10 [21]; different type of layers, fully-connected and con-
volutional layers; different data types of watermarks including a
256-bit random binary string and a byte-representation of 128×128
3-channel logo image; we use three different neural network archi-
tectures as the host model for embedding watermarks. Table 1 sum-
marizes the configurations for eachbenchmark. For thewide residual
network [39] architecture for Benchmark 3, we set depth parameter
N =1 andwidth parameterk=4 in all of the related experiments. For
Benchmark 1 (MNIST) and Benchmark 2 (CIFAR10-FC), we embed
the watermark into the weights for last layer, where the number
of weights is 64×10=640. For Benchmark 3 (CIFAR10-CONV), we
embed the watermark in the second convolutional layer in the conv
2 block of theWide Residual Network [39]. For a convolutional layer,
let F ,D, L respectively denote the size of the convolution filter, the
depth of input to the layer, and the number of filters in the layer.
Because theorderoffilters is arbitrary,weembed thewatermarkmes-
sage into themeanweights of afilter at eachfilter position.Hence the
number of embedding targets is F×F×D instead of the total number
of weights in a layer. In Benchmark 3 the number of embedding tar-
gets is 3×3×32×4=1152. All benchmarks are trained for 100 epochs.
We use RMSprop [35] with learning rate 0.00005 as the optimization
algorithm in the training of all of the neural networks in our scheme,
including Ftдt , Fext and Fdet . The parameter λ1 and λ2 is set to
be 0.01 and 0.1 respectively in Equation 7. We use simple 3-layer
fully-connected neural networks as the architecture for both Fext
and Fdet in our experiments, with appropriate input and output di-
mensions. The number of nodes in the hidden layer is set to be 512 for
both networks.Fdet usesWasserstein distance [3, 13] as its loss func-
tion,where the clip value is set to be 0.01. The number of iterations of
Fdet perFtдt iteration (i.e. thencr it ic in [3]) is set to be 5.Fext uses
binary crossentropy as the loss function when embedding binary
strings as watermark, and uses mean square error of pixel values as
the loss function when embedding images as watermark messages.
The number of iterations of Fext per Ftдt iteration is set to be 1.
6.2 Model Performance
We expect the accuracy of the watermarked deep learning model
not to degrade compared to the non-watermarked models. Table 2
summarizes themean and 95% confidence interval of the accuracy of
regularly trained models and models with a watermark message em-
bedded by our newwhite-box algorithm. The accuracy confidence
interval of models is obtained by non-parametric bootstrap tech-
nique described in [8]. The results demonstrate that our algorithm
maintainsmodel accuracy by optimizing the original functionwhilst
simultaneously embedding a watermark message. In some cases,
e.g. the CIFAR10-CONV benchmark, we even observe a slight accu-
racy improvement.This is due to the fact that our twoextra loss terms
(Ewm andEdet ) serve as regularizerswhereas thenon-watermarked
models are trained without regularizers. Regularization, in turn,
helps the model to avoid overfitting by introducing a small amount
of noise into the target model. Table 2 also includes the values of the
embedding loss for eachbenchmarkafter training2.Weconclude that
neural networks are capable of learning the ground truth function
while memorizing information injected from regularization.
6.3 Detection Attacks
We repeat our property inference attack to detect watermark pres-
ence. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our watermark detection
prevention, we assume the worst case where the attacker has the
knowledge of the training data and the exact model architecture of
Ftдt . We use the benchmark architecture 1 with MNIST and 256-bit
binary string watermark as the target model in which the attacker
wants to determine the presence of watermarks. We train 512 non-
watermarked models and 512 watermarked models using our algo-
rithm as the training set for the generic detector from Section 4.1. All
of the 1024models have the exact samearchitecture andall trainedby
the same data sets (MNIST) as the benchmark. We also generate 200
models as the test set (100 non-watermarked and 100 watermarked
by our algorithm). All of the generated models are well-trained and
have close performance to those of theMNIST benchmark in Table 2.
In Figure 3 (a) and (b), we show the training and test accuracy of
the generic detector Fdet . The attacks perform very different when
the watermarked models are trained with and without the detection
preventionalgorithminSection5.1.Whenwatermarkshavenodetec-
tion prevention, the property inference attack is extremely effective
as the accuracy climbs above 99% after 10 epochs training. However,
when the detection prevention GAN-like algorithm is employed in
the watermarking procedure, the performance of generic detector
drops dramatically. To demonstrate the robustness of our scheme,
we use the same 3-layer detector architecturewe usedwhen training
benchmarkmodels andamore complex7-layerneural networkarchi-
tecture as the detector Fdet in Algorithm 1. Figure 3 shows that the
performance of the property inference attack does not significantly
improve using a detector with a theoretically better learning ability.
Wealsocompare thedetectionaccuracyof the3-layerdetector toade-
tector that is trained on shadowmodels with random labels in Figure
3. In both cases the test accuracy is approximately equal, but slightly
higher than 50%. We believe the reason for the test accuracy to be
higher than 50%are the closeness of training instances, the small data
set size and that the task is simple binary classification. Furthermore,
the variance of prediction is high in our experiments [40] and it is not
atypical to have performance higher than the 50% expected value.
6.4 Removal Attacks
We evaluate the robustness of our new white-box watermarking
algorithm against three types of removal attacks, including model
fine-tuning [29, 32, 34], parameter pruning [14, 15] and watermark
overwriting [17, 37]. In all cases we demonstrate that it is hard to
remove watermarks that are embedded by our watermarking algo-
rithm. We again use the embedding loss to measure the degree of
match between embedded and extracted watermark.
6.4.1 Overwriting. We define two different variations of overwrit-
ing attacks:
2We denote the embedding loss as 0, if it is less than 1.00E-12.
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Table 1: Benchmark Setup
Data Set Embed. Layer Type Architecture Type Architecture
1 MNIST Fully-Connected Multi-layer Perceptrons 1*28*28-24C3(1)-BN(0.8)-24C3(1)-BN(0.8)-128FC-64FC-10FC
2 CIFAR10 Fully-Connected Conv. Neural Network 3*32*32-32C3(1)-32C3(1)-MP2(1)-64C3(1)-64C3(1)-MP2(1)-256FC-64FC-10FC
3 CIFAR10 Conv. Layer Wide Residual Network Wide Residual Network in [39] with N=1, k=4
Table 2: Benchmark Accuracy Confidence Intervals and Embedding Loss
Data Set Baseline Accuracy Watermarked Model Accuracy Baseline Embedding Loss256-BIN image 256-BIN image
MNIST 98.80%, (98.30%, 99.30%) 98.85%, (98.39%, 99.31%) 98.80%, (98.30%, 99.31%) 6.20E-06 5.12E-05
CIFAR10 74.60%, (72.39%, 76.31%) 75.20%, (73.68%, 76.70%) 73.90%, (71.99%, 76.20%) 0 2.28E-04
CIFAR10 79.00%, (76.60%, 80.41%) 82.20%, (80.29%, 84.10%) 81.45%, (79.59%, 83.40%) 3.50E-04 6.31E-06
Figure 3: Evaluation of property inference attack under
different watermarking algorithms.
(a) Training Accuracy (b) Testing Accuracy
• Overwriting by the same algorithm
The attacker may attempt to destroy the original watermark by
embedding his/her own watermarks in the target deep learning
model. In our experiments, we assume a worse case that the at-
tacker knows everything but message extraction key kE . That
is, the attacker has the knowledge of feature extraction key kF E ,
i.e. the attacker is aware of the layer in Ftдt where watermark
messagem is embedded. Furthermore,we assume that the attacker
has the knowledge of watermark extraction function e , i.e. Fext .
The only thing the attacker does know is the model parameter of
Fext , θ , which serves as our message extraction key kE .
• Overwriting by a different algorithm
An attacker may also try to remove the watermark by embedding
his/her own watermark into the neural network with a different
but somehow similar watermarking algorithm. Since our algo-
rithm uses the same type of feature extraction key kF E as Uchida
et al.’s algorithm, we test whether or not their algorithm will
overwrite our own watermark.
In the first set of experiments the attacker uses the algorithm
discussed in Section 5.3 to embed a different watermark message
into the watermarked layer by fine-tuning Ftдt . Tables 3 and 4 sum-
marize the effect of overwriting attack after 50 and 100 epochs. It can
be seen that thewatermark extraction error only increases very little
even after overwriting the watermark for 100 epochs with messages
of the same length.
Table 3: Embedding Loss after Overwriting (same)
Benchmark 50 epochs 100 epochs256-BIN image 256-BIN image
MNIST 4.87E-06 6.64E-03 4.59E-06 7.57E-03
CIFAR10-FC 0 2.08E-04 0 1.99E-04
CIFAR10-CONV 2.07E-05 2.10E-04 1.31E-06 1.98E-04
Table 4: Embedding Loss after Overwriting (different)
Benchmark 50 epochs 100 epochs256-BIN image 256-BIN image
MNIST 8.49E-05 2.18E-03 8.46E-05 7.06E-03
CIFAR10-FC 0 3.33E-04 0 5.35E-04
CIFAR10-CONV 3.17E-04 1.53E-02 5.19E-04 2.61E-02
6.4.2 Fine Tuning. Fine-tuning is a variant of overwriting where
the attacker post-processes the model, but does not aim to embed
a new watermark. It seems to be the most common case that may
remove the watermark message, since it is frequently used uninten-
tionally and requires less computational resources [31, 32, 38] than
training an original model. To perform this type of attack, one needs
to retrain the target model using the original or a new training set.
Formally, for a trained model Ftдt with parameterw , we fine-tune
the model by updatingw to be Train(Ef t )where Ef t can be same
as or different from Eo . Note that during fine-tuning, we train Ftдt
without the watermarking-related regularizers (Ewm , Edet ).
In the experiments,we consider a computationally strongattacker
who can fine-tune the models using the same amount of training
instances and epochs as the owner of Ftдt . We evaluate the robust-
ness of our newly proposedwatermarking schemeunder fine-tuning
attack (i) on the same data set (MNIST→MNIST) and (ii) between dif-
ferent data sets (MNIST→CIFAR10). In (ii), all images in theCIFAR10
data set were resized to 28×28 and converted to single channel for
compatibilitywith theMNIST data set. Because the CIFAR10 data set
is significantly more difficult than the MNIST data set, the model ac-
curacy is expected to decrease after fine-tuning. Therefore, after fine-
tuning with the CIFAR10 data set, we further fine-tune the resulting
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Table 5: Fine Tuning
Metrics MNIST->MNIST MNIST->CIFAR10256-BIN image 256-BIN image
# of epochs 50 100 200 50 100 200 50 100 200 50 100 200
model accuracy 98.69% 98.60% 98.60% 98.88% 98.82% 98.80% 97.16% 97.41% 97.42% 97.31% 97.10% 96.94%
embedding loss 0 0 0 7.0582E-05 7.0487E-05 7.0526E-05 0 0 0 0.0058 0.0121 0.0211
Figure 4: Model compression effect on 256-bit binary string watermark and logo image
watermark for each benchmark. The red dotted line represents model accuracy. The green
line represents embedding loss, which is binary cross entropy for binary strings and mean
square error for images.
(a) MNIST-BIN Benchmark (b) CIFAR10-FC-BIN Benchmark (c) CIFAR10-CONV-BIN Benchmark
(d) MNIST-IMG Benchmark (e) CIFAR10-FC-IMG Benchmark (f) CIFAR10-CONV-IMG Benchmark
Figure 5: ValidityWorst Case
(a) Fext1 (Ftдt1 )
(b) Fext1 (Ftдt2 )
modelwith theMNIST data set to restore themodel accuracy against
MNIST test data set. Table 5 summarizes the impact of fine-tuning on
the watermark extraction error, i.e. embedding loss, after different
numbers of epochs. We can see that, in both experiments, the wa-
termark extraction error slightly increases, but only insignificantly.
6.4.3 Model Compression. Model compression, i.e. the removal of
connections between someneurons in theneural network, is another
common post-processing operation of DNNs and hence a plausible
threat to embedded watermarks. We use the parameter pruning ap-
proach proposed in [15] to compress ourwatermarked deep learning
model Ftдt . To prune the embedded layer of neural network, we set
α% of the parameters inw with the smallest absolute values to zeros.
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of parameter pruning on watermark
detecting accuracy for all three architectures on 256-bit binary string
watermark messages. For the MNIST and CIFAR10-CONV bench-
mark, our watermarking scheme can tolerate up to 99% compression
ratio. For CIFAR10-FC benchmark, the BER will be slightly above
0 when compression ratio is 99% but still far less than 50% threshold,
while thewatermarkedmodel accuracy is already destroyed to lower
than 10%.
6.5 Validity
Validity, or non-trivial ownership, requires that the ownership of a
non-watermarked model is not falsely assumed by the watermark
extraction algorithm. If an owner tries to extract a watermark from
a non-watermarked model, the extracted message must be different
with overwhelming probability to satisfy the validity requirement.
We evaluate the worst scenario to demonstrate the validity of our
proposed scheme:
• Alice embedswatermarkm into targetmodelFtдt1 withextracting
neural network Fext1 .
• Bob embeds same watermarkm into target model Ftдt2 with ex-
tracting neural network Fext2 .
• Ftдt1 and Ftдt2 have the exact same architectures, trained with
exact same data set, hyperparameters and optimizing algorithm.
• Fext1 and Fext2 have the exact same architectures, hyperparam-
eters and training methods.
We test the above scenario by using the MNIST architecture and
logo images as watermark messages. We test whether or not Alice
can extractm from Ftдt2 by using Fext1 . Figure 5 shows the results
of the experiment described above. Because of the adaptive nature
of our watermark extraction function, Fext1 and Fext2 are likely to
become similar when all inputs are the same. However, as shown
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in Figure 5 (b), Fext1 can only extract an extremely blurred image
where the logo is extremely difficult, if at all, to recognize.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this work we generalize existing white-box watermarking algo-
rithms for DNNmodels and propose new attacks and defenses. We
first present a new attack that can reliably detect watermarks from
existing algorithms independent of training data set andmodel archi-
tecture. We then present a newwhite-box watermarking algorithm
whose watermark extracting function is also a DNN and which is
trained using an adversarial network. We performed plausible de-
tection (including our own) and removal attacks on watermarked
models, and showed that our watermarks are robust, particularly
compared to existing algorithms.
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